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INTRODUCTION
What is patentable in the United States, according to statute, dates
back to the first United States Patent Act of 1790. The provisions of
the U.S. patent code contain nothing specific about patenting living
organisms; late nineteenth-century developments at the U.S. Patent
4
and Trademark Office ("USPTO") both allowed3 and prohibited patents on living organisms. Fast forward a century, and the rapid advancements in biotechnology have led universities and companies
conducting biotechnology research and development (R & D) to increasingly depend upon patent protections. Part of this battle has included the fight to expand the boundaries of what can be patented.
Indeed, notwithstanding the recent temporary drop due to the economic crisis, the global number of patent applications has been steadily increasing. Based upon provisional date of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), 162,900 Patent Cooperation Treaty
5
("PCT") international patent applications were filed in 2010. Of that
total, it is estimated that 44,855 of those patent applications were filed
1
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Adjunct Professor, Loyola University Chicago Corboy School of Law.
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L.L.M., Chicago-Kent College of Law; L.L.M., Central European University, Budapest; Lecturer, University American College Skopje; Robert McNamara
World Bank Fellow, Terry Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University.
3 In 1873, Louis Pasteur received a U.S. patent for "Manufacture of Beer
and Yeast", in which yeast was deemed to be patentable subject matter. See U.S.
Patent No. 141,072 claim 2 (filed July 22, 1873) ("Yeast, free from organic germs of
disease, as an article of manufacture.").
4 In 1889 the U.S. Commissioner of Patents rejected an application for a
patent to cover a fiber identified in the needles of a pine tree. The Commissioner
reasoned that a contrary result would permit "patents [to] be obtained upon the trees
of the forest and the plants of the earth, which of course would be unreasonable and
impossible." Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm'r. Pat. 123, 126, 46 O.G. 1638,
1639.
5
See International Patent Filings Recover in 2010, WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROP. 0RG (Feb. 9, 2011),
http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2011/article_0004.html.
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by U.S. applicants. 6 According to the USPTO, 244,341 U.S. patents
were granted in 2010.7 Approximately 1.75% of those patents (precisely 4,293) had one or more claims directed to DNA. 8
The recent biotechnological advances in genetic engineering, recombinant DNA, gene therapy, achieved potential for cloning animals
and humans, and the isolation and manipulation of human embryonic
stem cells (hESCs), easily capture the imagination. The prospects for
their use in biomedical applications and personalized and regenerative
medicine are seemingly without boundaries. Cutting and pasting
genes into heterologous genomes has become a routine practice. Animals have been cloned through a variety of methods. Embryonic stem
cells can be grown in Petri dishes (while maintaining pluripotency and
preserving the ability to differentiate and form potentially any cell
type that makes up the body), serving as a sort of repair system for the
body. "Synthetic biology" offers the design and construction of new
biological functions and systems not found in nature. The potential of
these breakthrough biotechnological advances has made for great
·"Patenting Life" op-ed headlines. 9 However, the term "patenting life"
is a misnomer. As "life" is not defined in the patent code, in this article it is defined as the quality that distinguishes a vital and functional
being from a dead body, and further, as one or more aspects of the
process of living. 10 Life is a characteristic that distinguishes objects
that have signaling and self-sustaining processes (i.e., living organisms) from those that do not, either because they lack such functions
and are classified as inanimate, or because such functions have ceased
(through death). The fundamental principles on which a living system
is based are: program; improvisation; compartmentalization; energy;
regeneration; adaptability; and seclusion. 11
The rapid developments in biotechnology have affected and significantly challenged many areas of law, in particular patent law. In
1980, the seminal decision of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 12 in which the
6

Id.
U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963-2010, U.S. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm
(last updated Sept. 7, 2011, 10:16 AM).
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Life Definition, M-W.coM, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/life (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
11
Daniel E. Koshland Jr., The Seven Pillars of Life, 295 SCIENCE 2215
(2002), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/295/5563/2215.full (last
visited Oct. 24, 2011).
12
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980). The Court reasoned
that Congress, in passing 35 U.S.C. § 101, did not distinguish between inanimate
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U.S. Supreme Court ruled that living organisms are patentable subject
matter, 13 arguably helped spark the biotechnology revolution of today.
While the Chakrabarty opinion was directed toward the patentability
of a genetically altered micro-organism, and not genes, it is often cited
by proponents of gene patents for the mantra that "anything under the
sun that is made by man" may be patented. 14 In December 1982, the
USPTO issued the first gene patent, which claimed the expression of
genes for chorionic somatomammotropin, to the Regents of the University of California. 15 The primary examiner waited to examine the
patent pending the outcome of Chakrabarty decision. 16
Since Chakrabarty, biotech companies and academic institutions
have attempted to acquire ownership of gene sequences due to their
potentially high economic value. 17 As an indicator of the expansion
of biotechnology patents, the number of utility patent applications
filed with the USPTO increased 251%from1996 to 2010. 18 Through
2010, the number of issued US patents in the DNA Patent Database
(containing at least one claim that includes a nucleic-acid-specific
term "isolated" or "purified"-meaning not as it occurs in nature)was
almost 58,000. 19 Embryonic stem cell (ESC) research (and legal protection of the fruits of that research) emerged on the public scene in
1998. The first patent with claims directed to human ESCs was issued
in March 2001. 20 In the biomedical field, patents are extremely valuable to companies, particularly small companies. Patents provide a
means of securing investment income by establishing the company's
preeminence in a particular area of (bio)technology.

objects and living things as to patentable subject matter. The claimed genetically
engineered bacteria, the method of producing them, and the process of using them
were allowed.
13
Id. At 318.
14
Id. at 309 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 1923, at 6
(1952)).
15
U.S. Patent No. 4,363,877 (filed Apr. 19, 1978).
16
Matthew Rimmer, Genentech and the Stolen Gene: Patent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 5 B10-Sc1. L. REV. 198, 202 (2002).
17
See Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial
Incentives with Health Needs, 2 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 65, 66 (2002) ("The
patent on the human erythropoietin gene ... is worth more than $1.5 billion a year
.... ").
18
U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last updated
Sept. 7, 2011 ). There were 490,226 utility patent applications in 2010, as opposed to
195,187 such applications in 1996.
19
Snyder & Cook-Deegan, supra note 8.
20
U.S. Patent No. 6,200,806 (filed June 26, 1998).
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Research with and patentability of genes, transgenic organisms,
and stem cells makes for headline news and is at the center of a myr21
iad of ethical, religious, metaphysical, and political debates.
Because the moral and legal justifications are not identical, it is possible
for a legal decision to be immoral although consistent with legal
precedent and procedure. Contributing to that debate and enriching
the conversation, this article addresses some of the issues surrounding
patentability of inventions related to DNA, genes, stem cells, transgenic organisms and, in general, related to living matter. This article
reflects on the role of "patents on life inventions" in society, and discusses the intersection of legal, scientific, ethical, and moral issues
that surround the topic. It also analyzes empirical case studies to address both sides of the anti-commons debate and to determine if the
fear related to this effect in the biotechnology field is actually justified, or is largely over-estimated. In addition, this article focuses on
four common myths and perceptions related to controversial biotechnology inventions and their protection with patents, and then compares these myths and perceptions to the empirical evidence.
I. MYTH OR REALITY NO. 1: ISOLATED HUMAN GENES
ARE MERE DISCOVERIES OR CREATIONS OF NATURE,
AND ARE THUS UNPATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER.

The patentability of life and human subject matter has been debated over the years. One major myth regarding patents on living organisms is that the first "patent on life" was awarded in 1980 in Chakrabarty .22 However, Ananda Chakrabarty was beaten by over a century; in 1873 Louis Pasteur received a U.S. patent for a living organism. In the granted patent for "Manufacture of Beer and Yeast," yeast

21 See generally, George J. Annas, Life Forms, the Law and Profits, THE
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, (Oct. 1978), pp. 21-22; MICHAEL BELLOMO, THE STEM
CELL DIVIDE: THE FACTS, THE FICTION, AND THE FEAR DRIVING THE GREATEST
SCIENTIFIC, POLITICAL, AND RELIGIOUS DEBATE OF OUR TIME (2006); LEO FURCHT &
WILLIAM HOFFMAN, THE STEM CELL DILEMMA: BEACONS OF HOPE OR HARBINGERS OF
DOOM? (2008); SUZANNE HOLLAND ET AL., THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL
DEBATE: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (2001); KR:ISET R. MONROE ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF THE STEM CELL DEBATE: THE SCIENTIFIC, RELIGIOUS, ETHICAL AND
POLITICAL ISSUES (2007); LARS 0STNOR, STEM CELLS, HUMAN EMBRYOS AND ETHICS:
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (2008); JEREMY R:rFKIN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY:
HARNESSING THE GENE AND REMAKING THE WORLD (1998); Eric D. Zard, Patentability of Human Genetic Information: Exploring Ethical Dilemmas Within the Patent
Office and Biotechnology's Clash With the Public Good, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 486
(2009).
22 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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was deemed to be patentable subject matter. 23 Yet, patentability is not
without its limits. To date, the USPTO has set boundaries on patentability of living matter, expressly excluding patentability of human
beings, human embryos, and human/animal chimera. 24
Each of the patentability requirements under Title 35 of the U.S.
Code - patentable subject matter, novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness - could be raised with respect to gene patents. 25 However, courts have upheld patents on isolated and purified natural substances like isolated gene sequences. 26
The question of whether genes are patentable subject matter under
35 U.S.C. § 101 27 is presently being hotly debated, most recently in
the Myriad "gene patents" case. 28 The Federal Circuit reversed an
earlier district court decision that invalidated gene patents directed to
BRCAl and BRCA2. 29 On March 29, 2010, Judge Sweet of the
United States Federal District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued a lengthy opinion in which he characterized "DNA" and
"isolated DNA" as, respectively, the physical manifestation of DNA
and as "a segment of DNA nucleotides" existing separate from the
cell and other proteins. 30 However, on July 29, 2011, the Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the district court on the major substantive
issue and ruled that isolated DNA molecules do constitute patent eli-

23
U.S. Patent No. 141,072 (Filed July 22, 1873) (claiming "Yeast, free from
organic germs of disease, as an article of manufacture").
24
See generally, Sean M. Coughlin, The Newman Application and the
USPTO's Unnecessary Response: Patentability of Humans and Human Embryos, 5
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 90, 91 (2006).
25
See Andrews, supra note 17, at 70-72 (arguing that the useful properties of
the gene could be classified as natural, inherent properties of genes themselves and
stating that the computer sequencing techniques could make patenting genes obvious,
and arguing that a gene may not be novel enough after it is removed from an affected
individual).
26
See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir.
2003); Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 267 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
27
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title.").
28
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad), 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed.
Cir 2011), rev'g, 702 F.Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
29
Id, at 1353 ("We therefore reject the district court's unwarranted categorical exclusion of isolated DNA molecules.").
30
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d 181, 217
(S.D.N.Y 2010), rev'd, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The district court considered
whether the claimed compositions and methods constitute statutory subject matter or
fell under the judicially created products of nature exception to patentable subject
matter. Id. at 184-86.
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gible subject matter. 31 Still, this fight seems far from over, perhaps
with additional appeals yet to come.
The biological and legal definitions of DNA differ, but the reality
is the same; 32 isolated DNA does not exist in nature. Broadly defining
35 U.S.C. § 101, the Supreme Court in Chakrabarty distinguished
between products of nature, whether living or not, and a non-naturally
occurring manufacture or composition of matter-"a product of human ingenuity 'having a distinctive name, character [and] use.' "33
The district court in Myriad concluded that because patentable subject
matter must be markedly different from a product of nature, the
claimed isolated DNA was not markedly different from native DNA
and, therefore was not patentable under section 101. 34 However, that
reasoning was not accepted by the Federal Circuit. 35 Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently construed§ 101 broadly, explaining that
"[i]n choosing such expansive terms ... modified by the comprehensive 'any,' Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would
be given wide scope."36
To be patentable, an invention must be a "manufacture," obtained,
for example, through "the production of articles for use from raw or
prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities,
properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery."37 Even if the product were merely extracted without change,

31

Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1334. The Federal Circuit also
ruled that methods relating to the screening for potential cancer therapeutics are,
likewise, patent eligible subject matter. Id, However, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
decision of unpatentability for method claims reciting merely steps of "comparing" or
"analyzing" DNA sequences, on the grounds that these claims failed the machine or
transformation test from Bilski. Id,
32
Biologists will generally agree that "DNA" is a double helix molecule,
consisting of antiparallel strands in which the nucleotide units are linked by 5 '-3'
phosphodiester bonds. DNA is the genetic material in all known organisms and many
viruses. A "gene" is a DNA segment that encodes the information for producing a
polypeptide chain; it includes other regions as well. Cf GRAY'S ANATOMY 48-50
(Lawrence H. Bannister et al. eds., Churchill Livingstone 38th ed. 1995); THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE MEDICAL DICTIONARY 159 (Margery S. Berube et al. eds., 2008).
33
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980) (citing Hartranft v.
Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609 (1887)). The Court has previously stated that "[t]he 'matter' of which patentable new and useful compositions are composed necessarily includes naturally existing elements and materials." Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson
Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 162 (4th Cir. 1958).
34
Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 702 F.Supp.2d at 232.
35
See Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1351.
36
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. at 308).
37
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308.
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still, "there is no rule that such products are not patentable."38 To differ in kind, the product must have "a new utility in which invention
may rest." 39 As an example, an alkaloid cephalomannine, separated
and purified from the tissue of plants and found to be useful in causing remission of leukemic tumors in mice, was deemed patent-eligible
subject matter. 40 Likewise, an isolated gene that was previously unidentified and unknown, and was found to possess advantageous characteristics was patentable. 41 The process of creating a product of high
diagnostic and commercial value from an isolated, naturally occurring
gene, is not a "mere advance in the degree of purity of a known product."42 An isolated gene, although derived from a naturally occurring
gene, is a synthetic product made by man. In the process of isolating a
gene, copies of the naturally occurring gene are degraded or eliminated and the synthetic copies of that gene are further purified from
other nucleic acids, proteins, and other cellular components. Alternatively, synthetically produced nucleotides could be used to form a
copy of a target DNA sequence in vitro. The result is a man-made
synthetic DNA product that is identical to the template DNA with
regards to information stored for the use of polypeptide production ..
For patentability purposes, the new product is unique. The original (naturally occurring) DNA sequences are not only isolated, but
they are manipulated, synthetically copied, and/or amplified, thereby
creating an isolated, man-made DNA sequence that is based on the
naturally occurring sequence. Additionally, an isolated gene does not
occur naturally since all naturally occurring genes are integrated
within the genome of a cell43 . While the function of a specific DNA
sequence in a cell in its natural state is to code for a specific polypeptide, the use of an isolated gene is different from the use of a naturally
occurring gene in the cell. Therefore, when a gene is isolated from a
chromosome in a cell, it cannot be naturally regulated, meaning it
cannot perform its natural function. In addition, the function of a gene

38

Merck, 253 F.2d at 163 (confirming the patentability of isolated vitamin

B12).
39

Id. at 164.
U.S. Patent No. 4,206,221 (filed Jan 3, 1979).
41
Merck, 253 F.2d at 162-3. For example, BRCAl and BRCA2 genes can be
used as diagnostic tools to detect carriers with mutations. See Ass'nfor Molecular
Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1335.
42
Merck, 253 F.2d at 164.
43
Using molecular biology techniques, the polynucleotide sequence of a
gene is removed from the rest of the genome and is then manipulated in vitro. That
makes the gene "isolated" (from the rest of the genome).
40
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Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980) (citing Hartranft v.
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Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 702 F.Supp.2d at 232.
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See Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1351.
36
Bilski v. Kappas, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. at 308).
37
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308.
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heavily depends on its position in the genome; it is precisely the fact
that a gene is isolated from the genome of the cell that makes the gene
patentable.
Genes have a double nature, serving as both chemical substances
and as physical carriers of information. 45 A patent over a single gene
grants a monopoly over the use of the isolated gene, but not over the
information that it carries or the principle of how the information is
carried. Since a gene not only carries information, but is also a chemical compound, it is subject to the same requirements imposed upon
46
the chemical arts under Title 35 of the U.S. Code. Therefore, genes
47
.
constitute
patentable sub"~ect matter.
Globally, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights Agreement ("TRIPS") permits the patentability of genetic
material. 48 Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement clearly states: "patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve
49
an inventive step and are capable of industrial application." Thus,
TRIPS does not prohibit obtaining patents on genetic material.
Lastly, a few words about the "lawyer's trick" raised by Judge
Sweet in Myriad. 50 It is deja vu. Judge Sweet explained that isolating a gene to make it patentable is "a 'lawyer's trick' that circumvents
the prohibition on the direct patenting of the DNA in our bodies but

44 NEILA CAMPBELL ET AL., BIOLOGY 296 (5th ed. 1999) (changes in the
gene's position on a chromosome or changes in its copy number or in its sequence are
the causes for several disease).
45 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d 181, 228
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
46
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
47 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1334, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (reversing a district court's ruling that isolated DNA molecules are
unpatentable) ("[T]he PTO has issued patents directed to DNA molecules for almost
thirty years. In the early 1980s, the Office granted the first human gene patents. It is
estimated that the PTO has issued 2,645 patents claiming 'isolated DNA' over the
past twenty-nine years, and that by 2005, had granted 40,000 DNA-related patents
covering, in non-native form, twenty percent of the genes in the human genome.")
(citations omitted). Cf Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-18 (1980) (holding that a live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter because it
constitutes a "manufacture" or "composition of matter" within the meaning of 35
U.S.C. § 101.). See generally Eric J. Rogers, Can You Patent Genes? Yes and No, 93
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 19 (2010).
48 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art.
27.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
49 Id.
50
Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp.2d at 185.
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which, in practice, reaches the same result." 51 However, one hundred
years ago, in a decision regarding the patentability of purified adrenaline, Judge Learned Hand ruled:
Takamine was the first to make it available for any use by removing it from the other gland-tissue in which it was found,
and, while it is of course possible logically to call this a purification of the principle, it became for every practical purpose a
new thing commercially and therapeutically. That was a good
ground for a patent. 52
Similarly, in a 2010 speech at the BIO International Convention,
USPTO Director David Kappas stated:
To say that an isolated, purified DNA sequence is a product of
nature is like saying a silicon wafer of 99.9999% purity used in
the microelectronics industry, which I am very familiar with, is
a product of nature because, of course, silicon is found in the
Earth's crust. Of course, wafer grade silicon is not found in nature, we all know that. It requires an extremely intricate and
extremely laborious purification process.53
The fact that a substance exists in nature does not mean that a purified, isolated, or otherwise refined version of that substance is a
product of nature. Genes are statutory subject matter. 54 It is unclear
why DNA and Taxol (for example), both naturally occurring molecules and physical embodiments of the laws of nature, should be
treated differently once isolated. 55
II. MYTH OR REALITY NO. 2: PATENTS ON
BIOTECHNOLOGY INVENTIONS STIFLE RESEARCH.

Within the biotechnology and biomedical communities, scientists
and researchers alike have argued that the proliferation of patents in
Id.
Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
53
David Kappos, Director, USPTO, Speech at the BIO International Convention (2010).
54
See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
55
Taxol, isolated from yew trees, is patented. U.S. Patent No. 5,451,392
(filed Sept. 19, 1995). Other cases confirm the patentability of purified compounds.
See, e.g., Scripps Clinic and Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc.,
666 F. Supp. 1379, 1389 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (purified Factor VIII); In re Kratz, 592
F.2d 1169, 1175 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (strawberry fragrance).
51
52
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the area of genetics has severely inhibited genetic research as well as
patient care. 56 Due to rising transactional costs and the fear of litigation associated with patents, researchers are concerned that excessive
patenting of basic or upstream research will greatly inhibit innovation
of downstream technologies. 57 As discussed below, a number of empirical studies have been conducted to determine whether overpatenting of biotechnology research tools and genetic inventions have
detrimentally affected downstream innovation.
Opponents of patenting biotechnology inventions such as genes,
stem cells and research tools argue that patent ownership of research
58
tools increases transaction costs and impedes scientific progress. The
opponents contend that an anticommons effect could have a disastrous
impact on biomedical research. Because discoveries in biomedical
research are directly related to human health, the potential exists that
59
people may die if certain life-saving studies are blocked. The opponents further argue that anticommons may not only stem from the
patenting of broad claims, but from exclusively licensing the research
tools to a single company or university, thereby essentially eliminating competitive products. 60 Researchers list Myriad Genetics, BRCAl
and BRCA2 genes, hemochromatosis, and Canavan disease as contributing to this anticommons. 61 Some stem cell scientists believe that
"frivolous and overly broad patents ... mock science and muck up patenting. " 62 A closer look reveals that most of the focus over the past
56

Larry Greenemeier, Case Studies Reveal that Patents Can Hinder Genetic
Research and Patient Care, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Apr. 16, 2010),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=gene-patent.
57
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998).
58
John Stiglitz& John Sulston, The Case Against Gene Patents, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 16, 2010, at A19 (arguing that gene patents not only prevent the use of knowledge but also impede scientific research).
59
Ornid E. Khalifeh, The Gene Wars: Science, the Law and the Human
Genome 25-26 (Oct. 2009) (unpublished paper, Chapman University School of Law),
available at
\http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=lOOl&context=ornid_khalifeh.
60
See Greenemeier, supra note 56, at 1 ("The problem is not with the patents
themselves but rather when overly broad patents are exclusively licensed to a single
company or university .... ").
61
Ronald Bailey, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Do patents actually
impede innovation?, REASON.COM (Oct. 2, 2007),
http://reason.com/archives/2007/10/02/the-tragedy-of-the-anticommons (presenting
certain examples given by researchers and scientists as to the existence of an anticommons due to over proliferation of patents in the biotechnology field).
62
Don Moyer, Frivolous and Overly Broad Patents, SCIENCE PATENTING
NEXUS EXPLORED (July 28, 2008, 10:16 AM), http://sciencepatenting.blogspot.com/2008/07/frivolous-and-overly-broad-patents.html.
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few years, in regards to the tragedy of the anticommons, has centered
on the BRCA gene patents. 63 Because BRCA/Myriad is the only highprofile controversy that has illustrated the potential consequences of
patenting genes, the problem may be largely over-exaggerated. 64 Accordingly, it is important to analyze empirical data on both sides of
the research stifling/anticommons debate to reach a more accurate
conclusion on the issue, and to determine if the fear related to this
effect in the biotechnology field is actually justified, or is largely
over-estimated.
To date, the USPTO has issued over 2,000 patents directed to
stem cell technologies, and over 400 patents directed to embryonic
stem cell ("ESC") technologies. Three pioneer ESC patents with
broad claims were issued to James Thomson from the University of
Wisconsin, which he assigned to the Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation (WARF). 65 To escape the reach of WARF' s patents, some
organizations chose to conduct human embryonic stem cell research
outside of the U.S. 66 There was concern in the stem cell community
about how the availability and cost of licenses would affect the commercialization of stem cell therapeutics. 67 As discussed below, however, research which looks at the past decade shows this criticism may
be un-founded, based upon the scope of admirable research advances
63

See Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of
Human Gene Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091 (2006)
(illustrating that the subject of Myriad Genetics and BRCAl and BRCA2 was referenced in over 470 major policy documents since 2002).
64
See Bailey, supra note 61 (Claire Driscoll, Director of the National Human
Genome Research Institute' s Technology Transfer Office, voiced her opinion on the
link between biomedical research and the tragedy of the anticommons at a presentation in 2007: "In my 10 or 15 years of doing this [technology transfer], I hear the
same five examples or six examples repeated over and over. We can all name them
by heart: BRCAl and [BRCA]2; Myriad Genetics; hemochromatosis; Canavan disease. It's the same ones. Are there any new ones? Is it getting worse, or is it just
these few that are exceptional? I really think there are only a few, and I think it's the
same ones over and over again.").
65
Aurora Plomer et al., Challenges to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Patents,
2 CELL 13, 13 (2008). All three patents have been subjected to reexamination. See
infra, note 66.
66
Lisa A. Haile & Stacy Taylor, USPTO Rejects Broad Human Stem Cell
Patents, DLA PIPER (Apr. 5, 2007),
http://www.dlapiper.com/files/upload/10146%2001 %20Stem%20Cell %20Patent%20
Alert_vlsj_070405.html ("Even so, a number of organizations are choosing to conduct their embryonic stem cell research programs outside the United States, a decision
attributed by some to a desire to avoid the reach of the WARF patents.").
67
Id. (WARF has come under extensive criticism from the stem cell community for its insistence on license terms that many see as sufficiently onerous to
slow the progress of embryonic stem cell research.").
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in the embryonic stem cell field, accompanied by substantial patenting
activity.
Surveyed Canadian stem cell researchers were divided about the
impact of patents on the research environment. Even though there was
minimal evidence of problems associated with patenting and commercialization on research, the surveyors were not quick to dismiss the
concerns associated with patents and research commercialization.
Their perception was that patents can limit the ability of researchers to
carry out important research, increase secrecy among researchers,
unduly increase the cost of doing research, reduce the researchers'
ability to use patented technologies, increase dependence on industry,
68
and decrease public trust in science.
A comprehensive empirical study commissioned by the National
Academy of Sciences in 2003 analyzed the impact on downstream
69
innovation due to the patenting of upstream, basic research tools.
The study found almost no evidence of a breakdown in negotiations
between two parties due to a patent research tool leading to an R&D
project's cessation.70 There were only a few cases in which the transactional costs due to patents may have pre-empted some researchers
from pursuing a given project. 71 Additionally, no anticommons effect
72
was created due to patents on expressed sequence tags. The study
found that restricted access to research tools because of a patent
holder's exclusive license agreement could limit the exploitation of
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Timothy Caulfield et al., Patents, Commercialization and the Canadian
Stem Cell Research Community, 3(4) REGENERATIVE MED. 483, 485-86 (2008), available at http://www.futuremedicine.com/doi/pdf/10.2217/17460751.3.4.483? (twelve
out of twenty-five researchers surveyed stated that patents had a negative impact on
the research environment).
69 John P. Walsh et al., Science and the Law: Working Through the Patent
Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021 (2003) (conducting 70 interviews with IP attorneys,
business managers, scientists from 10 pharmaceutical firms and 15 biotech firms,
researchers and technology transfer officers from 6 universities, patent lawyers, and
government and trade association personnel).
70 John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on
Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285
(Wesley M. Cohen and Stephen A Merrill eds., 2003).
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Id. at 298 (When 55 of the respondents addressed the issue of project
cessation, 54 of them could not recall cancelling a specific project due to patents over
research tools. "One biotechnology executive stated: 'I am hard pressed to think of a
piece ofresearch that we haven't done because of blocked access to a research tool.
We have dropped products because others were ahead in proprietary position, but that
is different.' ").
72 Id. at 299 ("Our respondents suggested that this has not occurred.").
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research tools by other parties. 73 However, asserting exclusivity could
confer a benefit by increasing the incentives to do research to discover
the target first and then further invest in its research. 74
In 2005, responding to Madey v. Duke University, 75 the National
Academy of Sciences commissioned a study of bench scientists to
determine the impact of patents and licensing on access to biomedical
research tools. 76 This study found that the existence of patents did not
dissuade academic researchers from pursuing certain projects. 77 Only
3% of the respondents abandoned a project because too many patents
were covering their research tools. 78
A more recent empirical analysis of major stem cell patent cases
focused on whether an anticommons effect in this field was formed
after the Madey decision. 79 The main finding was that the post-Madey
fears of massive litigation against academic institutions had not been
realized. Contrary to popular belief, "the rate of litigation to issued
patents in the categories studied is extremely small, which calls into
question the claim that a large amount of litigation is causing an anticommons."80 In fact, the number of litigated stem cell cases from
1986 to 2007 actually decreased each year after 1997. 81
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Id. at 331 (finding that "restricted access to some upstream discovery ...
has not yet impeded biomedical innovation significantly, but our interviews and prior
cases suggest that the prospect exists and ongoing scrutiny is warranted.") ..
74
Id. at 310 ("[T]his right to assert exclusivity may confer a benefit in the
form of increasing the incentives to do the research to discover the target to begin
with.").
75
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that
university research did not fall under the common law experimental use exception
because it was not performed "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry," but as part of the university's legitimate business objective").
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John P. Walsh et al., View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002, 2002 (2005) (study based upon 414 received responses from
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Id. ("Thus, of 381 academic scientists, even including the 10% who
claimed to be doing drug development or related downstream work, none were
stopped by the existence of third-party patents, and even modifications or delays were
rare.").
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Id. at 2003 ("only 3% of respondents reported stopping a project in the
past 2 years because of a patent").
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Ann E. Mills & Patti M. Tereskerz, Empirical Analysis of Major Stem Cell
Patent Cases: The Role of Universities, 28 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 325 (2010).
This study analyzed the parties in 67 patent cases involving 23 patents related to stem
cells filed between 1986 and 2007. Out of the 67 cases, 7 involved university plaintiffs, while only 1 out of the 89 total defendants in those cases was a university. Id. at
326.
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Id. at 327.
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Id. at 325 figure 1.
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Proponents of gene patenting state that there is little empirical
evidence indicating that biomedical research has been stifled from
over-patenting. 82 They argue that due to the expensive practice of developing drugs and biologics, the patents on genetic sequences are the
necessary means to ensure the development of new drugs. 83 Because
of the importance of biotechnology research tool patents, gene patents, and stem cell patents, proponents suggest that fear over the threat
of a biotechnology anticommons is fueled by groups with a certain
political agenda that is antithetical to patenting. 84
Like human embryonic stem cells ("hESC") before them, human
iPSCs (induced pluripotent stem cells) are a pioneering biotechnology
invention. The world's first patent on iPSCs was granted in Japan to
Shinya Yamanaka in 2008. 85 In the United Kingdom, the world's second patent on iPSCs was granted to iPierian Inc. in 2010. 86 The first
U.S. patent on iPSCs was granted in 2010 to Rudolf Jaenisch at Fate
Therapeutics. 87 Like the broad claims obtained by Thomson/WARF
for the early hESC patents, 88 if the claims in the pioneering iPSCs
patents are interpreted too broadly, then iPSCs may face intellectual
property rights obstacles that are similar to hESCs. Moreover, the
stem cell community could be concerned about iPSCs because the
licensing system by WARF has been frequently criticized as having a
82

See Bailey, supra note 61 (''The good news is that evidence for a growing
biomedical research anticommons that can stifle biomedical research is almost nonexistent.").
83
Greenemeier, supra note 56 ("The biotech industry's stance has been that
its work is expensive and important and needs to be licensed so that this work may
continue.").
84
See Kevin E. Noonan, This Just In - The Anti-commons Aren't So Tragic,
PATENT Docs (Apr. 12, 2010, 11:59 PM), http://www.patentdocs.org/2010/04/thisjust-in-the-anticommons-arent-so-tragic.html (concluding that the main reason that
fears of a tragedy of the anticommons exist, despite evidence to the contrary, is to
"support a political agenda that is antithetical to patenting").
85
David Cyranoski, Japan Fast-Tracks Stem-Cell Patent, 455 NATURE 269,
269 (2008) (Japanese patent No. 2008-131577, international application
PCT/JP2006/324881 (filed June 12, 2006), publication number W0/2007/069666.).
86
PR Newswire, First iPierian Patent for Induced Pluripotent Stem Cell
Technology Granted by United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office, THE STREET
(Jan. 28, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/10668856/first-ipierianpatent-for-induced-pluripotent-stem-cell-technology-granted-by-united-kingdomintellectual-property-office.html ("UK patent No. GB2450603 ... is the first patent
protecting a fundamental method and utility of human iPSC technology that has been
granted outside of Japan.").
87
Ananyo Bhattacharya, First US Patent Issued for Induced Stem Cell Protocol, NATURE.COM (Feb. 4, 2010),
http://blogs.nature.com/news/thegreatbeyond/2010/02/first_us_patent_issued_for_ind.
html (citing U.S. Patent No. 7,682,828 (granted Mar. 23, 2010)).
88
Plamer et al., supra note 65, at 13.
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negative impact on the commercialization and development of
hESCs. 89 Therefore, the early iPSCs patents should be interpreted
narrowly to include only what the inventors have achieved in light of
the prior art, in order to avoid problems similar to those encountered
by hESCs.
III. MYTH OR REALITY NO. 3: PATENTS ON
BIOTECHNOLOGY INVENTIONS HAVE DETRIMENTAL
EFFECTS ON HUMAN HEALTH BY WAY OF DECREASING
ACCESS TO DRUGS AND GENETIC TESTING.

Over the past decade, few studies have analyzed the effect of biotechnology patents on the cost, access, and development of genetic
tests. One of these studies, conducted in 2003, concluded that researchers had negative perceptions of the effects of patents on the
cost, access, and development of genetic tests or data sharing. 90 In
contrast, "most respondents felt that patents did not have an effect on
the quality of testing."91 At the same time, patents and licenses were
perceived as having "a significant effect on the ability of clinical laboratories to develop and provide genetic tests." 92
The Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and
Society asked the Center for Genome Ethics, Law & Policy at Duke
University to examine the effect of patents on genetic tests for ten
clinical conditions: Alzheimer disease; breast cancer; Canavan disease; colon cancer; cystic fibrosis; hearing loss; hereditary hemochromatosis; long QT syndrome; spinocerebellar ataxias; and TaySachs disease. 93 The study revealed that patenting and licensing of
genetic tests had "limited the ability of clinical laboratories to offer
genetic testing." 94 Based on its research of the literature and public
comments, the study concluded that the existing patents could impede
89

Caufield et al., supra note 68, at 485-86.
Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on Provision of
Clinical Genetic Testing Services, 5 JOURNAL OF MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS
3,3 (2003). The study was based on a telephone survey of 122 clinical laboratory
directors in the United States who perform DNA-based genetic tests.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93
SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY,
REVISED DRAFT REPORT ON GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR
IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS 6-7 (2010), available at
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/SACGHS/SACGHS%20Patents%20Report%20Approved%
202-5-20010.pdf. The study focused on analyzing multiplex testing, where a single
test could simultaneously test for multiple genetic markers. Id. at 44.
94
Id. at 35 ("[T]he ability of clinical laboratories to offer genetic testing ...
can affect patient access, the quality of testing, and efforts to innovate.").
90
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innovation on future genetic testing. 95 Specifically, the thicket of gene
patents presents many challenges-most notably, the high cost of licenses and royalty fees, as well as the risk of litigation-for a laboratory to attempt to develop a multiplex test. 96 Due to the fear of litigation, clinicians were not reporting the results of patent-protected genes
97
in their multiplex tests, severely inhibiting the tests' effectiveness.
It is difficult to invent around a substantial number of patents relating to genetic testing. 98 Moreover, a recent reappraisal of human
gene patents and genetic testing in Europe considered the potential for
99
gene patents to affect the provision of genetic testing. There could
100
be a considerable effect on the delivery of genetic tests to patients.
The proponents of biotechnology patents believe that patents on
101
biotechnology inventions foster the development of new medicines.
Important gene-based drugs (such as insulin, erythropoietin, and
growth factor VIII) have enjoyed protection as patents while simultaneously providing medical benefits. 102 Thus, patents and patent licenses can be viewed as simply part of the cost of doing business.
Society relies largely on private entities to invest in developing new
genetic research-based treatments and diagnostics. It costs an estimated $1 billion to discover a new drug. 103 As an incentive to conduct
R & D, biopharma will want to continue to require some degree of
exclusivity over these technologies. How else can companies recover
their investment in R & D?
In reality, one is hard-pressed to provide evidence with respect to
the types of genetic tests that are unavailable due to patents. Furthermore, according to the USPTO' s utility guidelines, "whole genome"
95

Id. at 50 ("[T]he numerous existing patent claims on genes are already
affecting the use, if not the development, of multiplex tests in that clinicians are not
reporting the results for patent-protected genes in multiplex tests for fear of inviting a
lawsuit."). The study cited Myriad's patents and the Canavan disease patents as examples of when laboratories stopped giving genetic tests due to the enforcement of
those patents. Id. at 36.
96
Id. at 48.
97
Id. at 50.
98 Isabelle Huys et al., Legal Uncertainty in the Area of Genetic Diagnostic
Testing, 27 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 903,903 (2009) (citing commentators observation that "blocking patents" or "patent thickets" are "difficult or impossible to circumvent").
99 Naomi Hawkins, Human Gene Patents and Genetic Testing in Europe: A
Reappraisal, 7 SCRIPTED 453 (2010).
100
See Id. at 473 ("Patents on human genes could have a negative effect on
the translation of basic biomedical research into clinical application.").
101
Cho, supra note 90, at 7.
102
Andrews, supra note 17, at 66.
103 J.A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 181 (2003).
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sequencing would not infringe patent claims on individual genes, because the gene would not be isolated. Thus, the real issues revolve
around the costs of the tests, and to a lesser degree the restrictive licensing practices. Patient access may be affected due to a patent
holder's exorbitant royalty fee, thus increasing the transactional costs
for testing. 104
IV. MYTH OR REALITY NO. 4: PATENTING HUMAN
GENES AND STEM CELLS IS TANTAMOUNT TO
PATENTING LIFE AND IS THEREFORE INTRINSICALLY
IMMORAL.

Ethics and morality are intertwined with DNA, genes, and embryonic stem cells. Ethical judgments about patenting human genessuch as views that patenting genes amounts to a form of modem slavery, or that patenting creates monopolies on living organisms-are
abundant. Gene patents have increasingly faced public scrutiny, often
from people who lack the legal and technical background to fully understand genetics and the complexities of the patent. process. 105 This
lack of understanding has led them to make emotional and radical
one-sided arguments. 106
Furthermore, stem cells theoretically raise the issue of the patentability of living organisms, particularly humans. At least one of the
techniques (embryonic cloning), whereby cells are removed from an
embryo, already allows the creation of a viable adult. 107 Hence,
moral considerations are common to the policies excluding patentabil104

Illustrative examples of restrictive licensing practices include the BRCA
tests for ovarian and breast cancer (extensively discussed elsewhere) and the Canavan
disease tests. The ASP A gene and mutated sequences associated with Canavan disease were discovered and patented in 1997 by researchers at Miami Children's Hospital (MCH). LINDA L. McCABE & EDWARD R. B. McCABE, DNA: PROMISE AND
PERIL 155 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2008). After a litigation and subsequent settlement,
MCH continued to enforce "royalty-based genetic testing for certain licensed laboratories." Id. at 156. However, the agreement permitted academic institutions to engage
in royalty-free research of Canavan disease after 2003. Id. (citing "royalty-free research by institutions, doctors, and scientists searching for a cure").
105
See, e.g., Genes and patents: More harm than good?, THE ECONOMIST,
Apr. 17, 2010.
106
See generally MICHAEL CRICHTON, JURASSIC p ARK (Ballantine Books
1991) (recounting the mayhem that results in a world where genetic engineers resurrect dinosaurs); MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN; OR, THE MODERN PROMETHEUS (Signet Classic 3d. ed. 1983) (1831) (wherein the diabolical tinkering of the prototypical
"mad scientist" unleashes a nightmarish specter on unsuspecting villagers).
107
See Kathi E. Hanna, Cloning/Embryonic Stem Cells, NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH: NATIONAL HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INSTITUTE (April
2006), http://www.genome.gov/10004765.
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lack of understanding has led them to make emotional and radical
one-sided arguments. 106
Furthermore, stem cells theoretically raise the issue of the patentability of living organisms, particularly humans. At least one of the
techniques (embryonic cloning), whereby cells are removed from an
embryo, already allows the creation of a viable adult. 107 Hence,
moral considerations are common to the policies excluding patentabil104

Illustrative examples of restrictive licensing practices include the BRCA
tests for ovarian and breast cancer (extensively discussed elsewhere) and the Canavan
disease tests. The ASP A gene and mutated sequences associated with Canavan disease were discovered and patented in 1997 by researchers at Miami Children's Hospital (MCH). LINDA L. McCABE & EDWARD R. B. McCABE, DNA: PROMISE AND
PERIL 155 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2008). After a litigation and subsequent settlement,
MCH continued to enforce "royalty-based genetic testing for certain licensed laboratories." Id. at 156. However, the agreement permitted academic institutions to engage
in royalty-free research of Canavan disease after 2003. Id. (citing "royalty-free research by institutions, doctors, and scientists searching for a cure").
105
See, e.g., Genes and patents: More harm than good?, THE ECONOMIST,
Apr. 17, 2010.
106
See generally MICHAEL CRICHTON, JURASSIC p ARK (Ballantine Books
1991) (recounting the mayhem that results in a world where genetic engineers resurrect dinosaurs); MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN; OR, THE MODERN PROMETHEUS (Signet Classic 3d. ed. 1983) (1831) (wherein the diabolical tinkering of the prototypical
"mad scientist" unleashes a nightmarish specter on unsuspecting villagers).
107
See Kathi E. Hanna, Cloning/Embryonic Stem Cells, NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH: NATIONAL HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INSTITUTE (April
2006), http://www.genome.gov/10004765.
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ity of hESC - and they relate to the potential of developing into a mature human being. In 2001, President George W. Bush banned the
creation of new hESC lines with federal funding. 108 During the Bush
administration, scientists were forced to explore alternatives to hESCs
due to moral and policy concerns. 109
The use of embryonic stem cells in research is highly controversial. As discussed below, ethical judgments about the generation of
embryonic stem cells and their use in research and therapies are typically a function of the status accorded to the embryo. Some attempt to
frame the question in terms of the definition of life, whereby the central question becomes: is the human embryo a person or a piece of
property? Some feel that an embryo is a human being. They contend
that it is unethical to do anything to an embryo that should not be
done to a person. Others view the embryo as nothing more than a ball
of cells. They accord it a treatment similar to tissues and organs used
in transplantation.
Broad global, ethical guidelines regulate the patenting of genetic
inventions. The TRIPS Agreements allows each country the right to
refuse patents based on the morality laws of that country. 110 Indeed,
moral considerations are common to the policies excluding patentability of genetically engineered organisms. 111 Technical grounds of patentability also act as important safeguards of the public interest. 112
Yet technological advances reframe the morality questions.
Some European countries have banned research and patents on
hESCs because they are parts of a human body .113 European patent
law contains a narrowly construed morality test, which is formally and
explicitly embedded in patent law; European patents are not granted
for inventions for which the commercial exploitation of those inven-
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tions would be contrary to ordre public or morality. 114 However, such
exploitation is not deemed to be contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the European Patent Con.
.
115
vent10n contractmg states.
In the U.S., hESCs are patentable subject matter. Under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, "whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent." 116 Even though hESCs
are derived from embryos, the fact that they are living matter does not
preclude them from patentability. Since hESCs are isolated from the
inner cell mass of embryos, they are altered by man and do not occur
naturally; thus, they are patentable. The USPTO has not deemed
hESCs to be the equivalent of a human being for patenting purposes.117 In general, in the U.S., morality seems to have played little
role in biotechnology patenting. In the context of hESCs, the medical
benefits could help counterbalance the moral core of the opponents.
However, claims about the sanctity of embryonic life are less compelling because images of sick children, suffering adults and grieving
relatives often override and displace the pro-life images of embryos
that have had such a powerful impact on the abortion debate. 118
In reality, the empirical data does not support the perceived concerns and expressed fears. The patenting of a single human gene has
nothing to do with patenting life. It is scientifically inaccurate to ascribe genes with a special role, just as if they were life itself. 119 It is
also legally inaccurate to equate genes with life. In Amgen v. Chugai,
the gene was defined as "a chemical compound, albeit a complex one
120
•••• "
Yet, although a gene was first awarded patent protection in

108

See Bush's Address on Federal Financing for Research with Embryonic
Stem Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2001, at A16.
109
See Thomas Scott & Renee A. Reijo Pera, The Road to Pluripotence: The
Research Response to the Embryonic Stem Cell Debate, 17 HUMAN MOLECULAR
GENETICS R3, R3-R7 (2008); Exec. Order No. 13435, 72 Fed. Reg. 34,591 (June 20,
2007).
110
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art.
27.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
111
Cf Diamond v. Chak:rabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) (Stating that discussion about patentable subject matter necessarily "involves the balancing of competing values and interests, which in our democratic system is the business of elected
representatives.").
112
See Andrews, supra note 17, at 70-72.
113
Todd N. Spalding & Michele M. Simkin, How Will Patents Impact the
Commercialization of Stem Cell Therapeutics?, 19 No. 1 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L. J.
7, 7 (2007).

Id.
European Patent Convention, art. 53(a), Dec. 13, 2007, available
athttp://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/7bacb229e032863dc12577e
c004ada98/$FILE/EPC_14th_edition.pdf. Case law has established that the exclusion
only concerns extreme cases that are universally regarded as abhorrent, and European
patents have been granted for the majority of biotechnology achievements.
116
35 u.s.c. § 101 (2010).
117
Spalding & Simkin, supra at Note 113, at 7 (The USPTO "has not deemed
embryonic stem cells to be the equivalent of a human being.").
118
Janet L. Dolgin, Embryonic Discourse: Abortion, Stem Cells and Cloning,
31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 101, 158 (2003) ("The images produced by such narratives can
provide alternatives to and thus displace pro-life images of fetuses and embryos. In
the face of images of embryos-as-salvation for individual, sick children and disabled
heroes, assertions about embryonic personhood may pale.").
119
Cf Helen Pearson, Genetics: what is a gene?, 441NATURE398 (2006).
120
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
114
115
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1982, 121 the debate regarding patenting genes is still continuing and
122
in the U.S. reached a new peak in the Myriad case.
The ethical concerns that accompany hESCs are not at issue for
iPSCs. For example, one method used to create genetically matched
patient-specific hESCs is through somatic cell nuclear transfer
(SCNT). 123 However, there are unknown risks, and many legal and
ethical problems associated with oocyte donation and SCNT, as
124
"SCNT is commonly used to produce clones."
An oocyte containing "DNA from an adult cell could in theory be implanted into a
125
woman's uterus and come to term as an actual cloned human."
Thus, there exists strong opposition to the use of SCNT to generate
hESCs. Human cloning is not just a matter of ethical debate; it is illegal.126
In contrast to hESCs, iPSCs are derived from adult cells, not from
embryos. 127 Therefore, creating iPSCs does not require oocyte donation.128 Unlike deriving hESCs from SCNT, there are ample adult
129
cells (such as skin), from which researchers can derive iPSCs. In
addition, iPSCs have the same benefits as hESCs derived from
SCNT .130 Similar to hESCs, iPSCs are patentable subject matter in the
U.S. under 35 U.S.C. § 101. They are manipulated by man, repro-

121
122

U.S. Patent No. 4,363,877 (filed Apr. 19, 1978).
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.
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grammed to behave as stem cells, and should thus be considered a
131
composition of matter or a manufacture.
There would seem to be less moral opposition to iPSC patentability and to the similar new discoveries related to reprogramming human adult cells to behave much like hESCs. Yet the philosophical
question remains: will opponents of embryo research embrace the
concept of using iPSCs or the concept of reprogramming cells to their
embryonic state? It might be 'possible to use an induced pluripotent
stem cell or a reprogrammed cell to create an entire person, in the
same way that an implanted embryo can develop into a person. Given
this possibility, will people who believe embryos have the same moral
value as persons (and thus should not be used for experimentation),
believe that iPSCs (and skin cells that are used for derivation iPSCs)
or reprogrammed cells should also not be used for experimentation?
There is a substantial difference between an embryo, embryonic stem
cell, induced pluripotent stem cell and skin cell, but not everyone who
favors the protection of embryos thinks this difference is dispositive
of the question. 132
The prudency of allowing the USPTO to make moral assessments
is questionable. Patent law is not the appropriate vehicle for regulation
133
of technology based on moral or ethical concerns. Appropriate
legislation or regulatory vehicles, such as research regulation, should
be used instead. 134
V. SOLUTIONS FOR DEMYTHIFICATION THROUGH
PATENT LAW AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES

2011).
123 See George Q. Daley, Towards the Generation of Patient-Specific Pluripotent Stem Cells for Combined Gene and Cell Therapy of Hematologic Disorders,
HEMATOLOGY 17, 18 (2007) (discussing the history of SCNT as used for modeling
disease and its promise in creating hESCs).
124 Jonathan M.W. Slack, Stem Cell: Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Dec. 6, 2008),
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/565 211/stem-cell.
12s Id.
126 Id. ("[T]he cloning of humans is currently illegal throughout the world

.... ").

127 Jonathan M.W. Slack, Stem Cell: Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells, Encyclopedia Britannica (Dec. 6, 2008),
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/565211/stem-cell (explaining the process of using adult cells in iPSCs).
12s Id.
129 See Sayandip Mukherjee, Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells: A New Hope or
a New Controversy?, 0PTICON1826, Autumn 2008, at 3-4, available at
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/opticon1826/archive/Issue5/Article_BM_Mukherjee.pdf (describing the discovery of and further research into iPSCs derived from adult human
fibroblasts).
130 See id. (summarizing the results of iPSC testing).

Based on empirical data from a variety of sources, the perceptions
and fears over cloning humans, the generation of human-animal chimeras, the tragedy of the anticommons, and the other evils within the
135
biotechnology community all seem to be largely overestimated.
131

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful .... manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor .... ") .
132
When it was demonstrated that it is possible to use single cells from 8-cell
embryos to create cell lines, some opponents of embryo research (including Senator
Sam Brownback) protested on the ground that the single cell in question deserved
protection. See Russell Korobkin, Exciting Stem Cell News, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Nov. 20, 2007, 2:49 PM), http://volokh.com/posts/l 195588155.shtml.
133
See Bratislav Stankovic, Patenting the Minotaur, 12 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 5,
35 (2005), available at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v12i2/article5.pdf (discussing
biotechnology critics' attack on patent law, and how the proper forum for these critics
is the Legislature).
134 Id.
135
See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 61; Mills & Tereskerz, supra note 79.
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While there is little substantiated evidence to support the notion that
patents on basic research tools, genes, and stem cells are the reasons
scientists decided to abandon downstream research, some empirical
data establishes that gene patents impede innovation on genetic testing.136 Nevertheless, various legal and policy solutions could be
adopted to prevent an escalation of the myths, and to prevent anticipated problems.
Some aspects of demythification can be achieved through imple. mentation of novel ideas for creative patentability and licensing of
biotech/genetic inventions. Historically, researchers have managed to
limit the negative effects of research tool patents by implementing a
number of working solutions; successful strategies included ignoring
patents, going offshore, creating public databases, and challenging
patents in courts. 137 Before becoming creative in pursuit of working
solutions, the researchers would typically identify the relevant patents
and then attempt to obtain a license to use the patented technology
from the various biotech firms. 138 IT negotiations broke down, researchers would either attempt to invent around the existing patents or
implement a working solution. 139 Indeed, research and commercialization in the biomedical sciences continues despite the proliferation of
patents on upstream biotechnologies.
The voluntary formation of patent pools by biotech firms and genetic testing companies could alleviate some of the negative effects
associated with the enforcement of patents on basic research tools and
140
other fundamental biotechnology inventions. However, this may be
an unlikely scenario because the biotech community may be unwilling

136

This is precisely what happened with the Canavan patents owned by
MCH. See McCabe & McCabe, supra note 104, at 154-56.
137
Walsh et al., supra note 69, at 324.
138 See Id. at 322 (examining the practice of contracting for research tool
patent licenses, specifically in the drug industry).
139 Id. at 314-17. Researchers noted that identifying the relevant patents in a
given field is both costly and time consuming, but identifying patents is expected due
to the increased number of patents granted for research tools. The study reported that
over half of the interviewees agreed that the patent landscape had become more complex, but interestingly, that the actual number of patents needed to be cleared for a
given project is often substantially smaller than one would assume. For example, a
1998 study examining the method of putting hemoglobin in maize discovered that out
of 500 patents reviewed on the subject matter, only 13 patents were relevant. Id. at
294.
140 A patent pool is an agreement between two or more patent owners to license their patents as a package to one another, as well as third parties willing to pay
the associated royalties. See SECRETARY'S .ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETICS,
HEALTH, AND SOCIETY, supra note 93, at 50-54 (discussing the use of patent pools as
an approach to solve "patent thickets").

THE SELFISH PATENT

2011]

89

to form patent pools for genetic testing, especially when companies
can make higher profits licensing their own tests individually. 141 Societal or government pressure may be necessary to create a patent
pool, particularly when patent exclusivity is being used contrary to the
public interest. 142
March-in rights already exist in international and U.S. patent law:
the U.S. government can force non-exclusive license if research was
supported by government funds. 143 One policy alternative is to lobby
Congress to change biotech patenting legislation to make it subject to
a public interest provision in addition to those already outlined in 37
C.F.R. § 401.14. For example, if a patent was obtained using federal
funds (such as from the National Institute of Health ("NIH")), and
there is a public outcry that the patent-holder is enforcing its patent
contrary to the public interest, then the NIH would be able to force a
compulsory license at reasonable terms. The public interest provision
could be somewhat similar to Article 53(a) of the European Patent
Convention, which prohibits patents for "inventions the exploitation
of which would be contrary to [public order] or morality .... " 144 This
type of provision would not be an outright ban on research tool patents, but rather 'Yould allow the federal funding agency (e.g., NIH) the
ability investigate the issue. IT the NIH determines that a patent
holder's enforcement of a certain patent is contrary to the public interest, the NIH would draft a reasonable licensing agreement. This would
eliminate transaction costs to laboratories because there would be no
negotiation of licensing terms.
Patent law already provides a claim scope gatekeeping mechanism, which can be illustrated with patents on stem cell inventions.
Even though stem cell intellectual property is complex, due to moral,
technical, and legal factors, 145 iPSCs offer a promising alternative
with decreased ethical barriers. To prevent iPSC patents from impacting downstream technological advances in stem cell research and
141

Id. Additionally, one patent holder can hold out from entering a patent
pool if they own a patent covering an important claim or gene and exploit it for their
own purposes. Id. Furthermore, if a company owns all the patents related to a gene
mutation relevant for testing, there would be less of an incentive to join a patent pool.
Id.
142
The Canavan disease and genetic testing story is informative. Due to the
mounted response by the Canavan organizations and the Jewish community against
MCH' s methods of enforcing its ASPA gene patent, MCH subsequently changed its
practices. The same change in patent enforcement could also be possible with other
patent holders through formation of patent pools and a change in legislation. See
McCabe & McCabe, supra note 104, at 155-56.
143
37 C.F.R. § 401.14 (2004).
144
European Patent Convention, supra note 115, at art. 53(a).
145
Plomer et al., supra note 65.
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implement a working solution. 139 Indeed, research and commercialization in the biomedical sciences continues despite the proliferation of
patents on upstream biotechnologies.
The voluntary formation of patent pools by biotech firms and genetic testing companies could alleviate some of the negative effects
associated with the enforcement of patents on basic research tools and
140
other fundamental biotechnology inventions. However, this may be
an unlikely scenario because the biotech community may be unwilling

136 This is precisely what happened with the Canavan patents owned by
MCH. See McCabe & McCabe, supra note 104, at 154-56.
137 Walsh et al., supra note 69, at 324.
138 See Id. at 322 (examining the practice of contracting for research tool
patent licenses, specifically in the drug industry).
139 Id. at 314-17. Researchers noted that identifying the relevant patents in a
given field is both costly and time consuming, but identifying patents is expected due
to the increased number of patents granted for research tools. The study reported that
over half of the interviewees agreed that the patent landscape had become more complex, but interestingly, that the actual number of patents needed to be cleared for a
given project is often substantially smaller than one would assume. For example, a
1998 study examining the method of putting hemoglobin in maize discovered that out
of 500 patents reviewed on the subject matter, only 13 patents were relevant. Id. at
294.
140 A patent pool is an agreement between two or more patent owners to license their patents as a package to one another, as well as third parties willing to pay
the associated royalties. See SECRETARY' s ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETICS,
HEALTH, AND SOCIETY, supra note 93, at 50-54 (discussing the use of patent pools as
an approach to solve "patent thickets").
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to form patent pools for genetic testing, especially when companies
can make higher profits licensing their own tests individually. 141 Societal or government pressure may be necessary to create a patent
pool, particularly when patent exclusivity is being used contrary to the
public interest. 142
March-in rights already exist in international and U.S. patent law:
the U.S. government can force non-exclusive license if research was
supported by government funds. 143 One policy alternative is to lobby
Congress to change biotech patenting legislation to make it subject to
a public interest provision in addition to those already outlined in 37
C.F.R. § 401.14. For example, if a patent was obtained using federal
funds (such as from the National Institute of Health ("NIH")), and
there is a public outcry that the patent-holder is enforcing its patent
contrary to the public interest, then the NIH would be able to force a
compulsory license at reasonable terms. The public interest provision
could be somewhat similar to Article 53(a) of the European Patent
Convention, which prohibits patents for "inventions the exploitation
of which would be contrary to [public order] or morality .... " 144 This
type of provision would not be an outright ban on research tool patents, but rather 'Yould allow the federal funding agency (e.g., NIH) the
ability investigate the issue. H the NIH determines that a patent
holder's enforcement of a certain patent is contrary to the public interest, the NIH would draft a reasonable licensing agreement. This would
eliminate transaction costs to laboratories because there would be no
negotiation of licensing terms.
Patent law already provides a claim scope gatekeeping mechanism, which can be illustrated with patents on stem cell inventions.
Even though stem cell intellectual property is complex, due to moral,
technical, and legal factors, 145 iPSCs offer a promising alternative
with decreased ethical barriers. To prevent iPSC patents from impacting downstream technological advances in stem cell research and
141

Id. Additionally, one patent holder can hold out from entering a patent
pool if they own a patent covering an important claim or gene and exploit it for their
own purposes. Id. Furthermore, if a company owns all the patents related to a gene
mutation relevant for testing, there would be less of an incentive to join a patent pool.
Id.
142
The Canavan disease and genetic testing story is informative. Due to the
mounted response by the Canavan organizations and the Jewish community against
MCH's methods of enforcing its ASPA gene patent, MCH subsequently changed its
practices. The same change in patent enforcement could also be possible with other
patent holders through formation of patent pools and a change in legislation. See
McCabe & McCabe, supra note 104, at 155-56.
143
37 C.F.R. § 401.14 (2004).
144
European Patent Convention, supra note 115 at art. 53(a).
145
'
Plamer et al., supra note 65.
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commercialization, examiners and courts should be careful to allow
iPSC patent claims to be only as broad as the specification allows in
light of the breadth of the prior art. Pioneer inventors deserve exclusive rights for their discovery, but not at the expense of hindering fu146
ture innovation and research.
Biotech inventors and patent prosecutors must use creative patent
claim drafting and emphasize the differences between isolated and
natural DNA. Arguably, isolated DNA may be patentable as a cultural
artifact that has no equivalent to naturally occurring DNA in vivo.
Isolated DNA is a unique result of modifying the DNA by placing it
in an appropriate medium (e.g., a polypeptide-encoding polynucleotide that does not have the naturally occurring chemical modifications,
methyl groups, amines, metal ions, etc.). Isolated cDNA is not found
147
in nature.
An argument could also be made for patentability of a product-byprocess: to qualify for patentability, an element from the human body
must be the product of technical processes which have identified, purified, and characterized the product outside of the human body.
Again, such techniques cannot be found in nature. In addition, isolated
stem cells may be patentable as cultural artifacts. If used for derivation of an embryonic stem cell line, blastocysts are explanted into a
culture medium and cultured in vitro. 148 This effectively results in
selection for in vitro survival; pluripotency is a useful side product of
the procedure. 149 Consequences in proof are: different chromatin configurations; different epigenetic characteristics; disturbed methylation;
loss of imprinting; and significantly higher incidence of BeckwithWidemann syndrome in IVF babies, an imprinting disorder caused by
150
LOI of Igf2 and other imprinted genes. This results in the creation
of a novel cell type; an isolated embryonic stem cell represents a cul151
tural artifact that has no equivalent to cells of the embryo.
The controversies that surround the issuance of patents on genetic
inventions stem from conflicting social policies that utilize the patent
system as a vehicle of expression. Yet the debate surrounding the issue of patentability of biotechnology inventions ultimately boils down
146 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 908 (1990).
147 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d 181, 196
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining DNA extraction).
148 Mats G. Hansson et al., Isolated Stem Cells-Patentable as Cultural Artifacts?, 25 STEM CELLS 1507, 1507 (2007) (explaining the process of creating novel
stem cells through blastocyst culturing).
149
Id. at 1508.
150 Id.
151 Id.
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to the same thing: should we be patenting something so fundamental?
From a legal point of view, the answer is most likely "yes." Multiple
precedents exist for patentability of other revolutionary technologies
in the life sciences. These include growing cells and tissues in vitro, 152
recombinant DNA methods, 153 and PCR. 154 Patent law is not the right
forum for balancing biotechnology discoveries with ethical, moral,
and religious beliefs, and should not be used for prohibiting activity
that may be regarded as objectionable on grounds unrelated to patent
law. 155 Various doctrines in patent law (subject matter, utility, written
description requirement, enablement requirement, person of ordinary
skill in the art, equivalents, etc.) provide the judiciary with ample
tools to tailor patent law to the needs of specific subject matter. If
deemed appropriate and necessary, sui generis patent categories for
(some fundamental) biotechnology inventions may be created.
"[P]ublic policy, including patent law, should encourage inventive
rivalry, and not hinder it." 156 It would be inappropriate to deny patentability of inventions on the basis of speculative future risks. The
biotechnology patent may appear selfish-just like the gene it may
correspond to-but governments would be hypocritical to encourage
innovation, invention, and patenting, while at the same prohibiting
controversial biotechnology research.

152 T"issue cul ture propagator and method. U.S. Patent No. 3,407,120 (filed
Dec. 23, 1965).
153
Recombinant DNA method. U.S. Patent No. 5,747,308 (filed Feb. 7
1995).
'
154 p
CR method. U.S._ Patent No. 7,101,663 (filed Mar. 4, 2002).
155
Regretfully, other issues such as abortion keep influencing the policy. For
example, in 2004 Rep. Dave Weldon (R-FL) sponsored an amendment to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, aimed at preventing the use of federal funds to
issue patents on human organisms, including embryos and fetuses. The vague,
overly-broad language did not define "human organism" and it could have precluded
patenting of many human-derived biotechnology inventions. 149 CONG. REc. E2417
(daily ed. Nov. 22, 2003) (statement of Rep. Weldon).
156
Merges & Nelson, supra note 146, at 908.

90

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET [Vol. 3:1

commercialization, examiners and courts should be careful to allow
iPSC patent claims to be only as broad as the specification allows in
light of the breadth of the prior art. Pioneer inventors deserve exclusive rights for their discovery, but not at the expense of hindering fu146
ture innovation and research.
Biotech inventors and patent prosecutors must use creative patent
claim drafting and emphasize the differences between isolated and
natural DNA. Arguably, isolated DNA may be patentable as a cultural
artifact that has no equivalent to naturally occurring DNA in vivo.
Isolated DNA is a unique result of modifying the DNA by placing it
in an appropriate medium (e.g., a polypeptide-encoding polynucleotide that does not have the naturally occurring chemical modifications,
methyl groups, amines, metal ions, etc.). Isolated cDNA is not found
147
in nature.
An argument could also be made for patentability of a product-byprocess: to qualify for patentability, an element from the human body
must be the product of technical processes which have identified, purified, and characterized the product outside of the human body.
Again, such techniques cannot be found in nature. In addition, isolated
stem cells may be patentable as cultural artifacts. If used for derivation of an embryonic stem cell line, blastocysts are explanted into a
148
culture medium and cultured in vitro.
This effectively results in
selection for in vitro survival; pluripotency is a useful side product of
the procedure. 149 Consequences in proof are: different chromatin configurations; different epigenetic characteristics; disturbed methylation;
loss of imprinting; and significantly higher incidence of BeckwithWidemann syndrome in IVF babies, an imprinting disorder caused by
LOI of Igf2 and other imprinted genes. 150 This results in the creation
of a novel cell type; an isolated embryonic stem cell represents a cul151
tural artifact that has no equivalent to cells of the embryo.
The controversies that surround the issuance of patents on genetic
inventions stem from conflicting social policies that utilize the patent
system as a vehicle of expression. Yet the debate surrounding the issue of patentability of biotechnology inventions ultimately boils down
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 908 (1990).
147 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d 181, 196
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining DNA extraction).
148 Mats G. Hansson et al., Isolated Stem Cells-Patentable as Cultural Artifacts?, 25 STEM CELLS 1507, 1507 (2007) (explaining the process of creating novel
stem cells through blastocyst culturing).
149
Id. at 1508.
150 Id.
151 Id.
146

2011]

THE SELFISH PATENT

91

to the same thing: should we be patenting something so fundamental?
From a legal point of view, the answer is most likely "yes." Multiple
preced~nts ~xist for patentability of other revolutionary technologies
m the hfe sciences. These include growing cells and tissues in vitro 152
.
DNA methods, is3 and PCR. is4 Patent law is not the right
'
recombmant
forum for balancing biotechnology discoveries with ethical, moral
and religious beliefs, and should not be used for prohibiting activit;
that may be regarded as objectionable on grounds unrelated to patent
. doctnnes
.
. patent law (subject matter, utility, written
m
1aw. 155 v arious
de~cr~ption requirem~nt, enablement requirement, person of ordinary
skill m th~ art, eqmvalents, etc.) provide the judiciary with ample
tools to tailor patent law to the needs of specific subject matter. If
deemed appropriate and necessary, sui generis patent categories for
(some fundamental) biotechnology inventions may be created.
"[P]ublic policy, including patent law, should encourage inventive
rivalry, and not hinder it." 156 It would be inappropriate to deny patentability of inventions on the basis of speculative future risks. The
biotechnology patent may appear selfish-just like the gene it may
~orresp?nd t:bu~ governments would be hypocritical to encourage
mnovatlon, mvent10n, and patenting, while at the same prohibiting
controversial biotechnology research.

152 T.issue cu lture propagator and method. U.S. Patent No. 3,407,120 (filed
Dec. 23, 1965).
153
Recombinant DNA method. U.S. Patent No. 5,747,308 (filed Feb. 7
1995).
'
154 PC R method. U.S .. Patent No. 7,101,663 (filed Mar. 4, 2002).
155
Regretfully, other issues such as abortion keep influencing the policy. For
example, in 2004 Rep. Dave Weldon (R-FL) sponsored an amendment to the Con~olidated Appropriations Act of 2004, aimed at preventing the use of federal funds to
issue patents on human organisms, including embryos and fetuses. The vague,
overly:broad language did not define "human organism" and it could have precluded
patentmg of many human-derived biotechnology inventions. 149 CONG. REc. E2417
(daily ed. Nov. 22, 2003) (statement of Rep. Weldon)
156 M
erges & Nelson, supra note 146, at 908. ·

92

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET [Vol. 3:1

ARE TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES AT
THE SUPREME COURT CAUSING A
''DISREGARD OF DUTY''?
Mark Grabowski 1
ABSTRACT
Recent U.S. Supreme Court cases involving technology-related issues indicate that several Justices are embarrassingly ignorant about
computing and communication methods that many Americans take for
granted. Indeed, some Justices admit they are behind the times. Yet,
as members of the nation's highest court, they are increasingly asked
to set legal precedents about these very technologies. The implications
are profound for U.S. media law because, with the advent of the Digital Age, speech and expression have become intertwined with technology. The article argues that it is crucial for our most important
decision-makers to keep pace with the times; otherwise, they may
make poor legal decisions or avoid hearing important cases because
they do not grasp the issues involved. In fact, such missteps may already be occurring. A few possible solutions are offered.
INTRODUCTION
If you are in America and not yet acquainted with cell phones,
computers and the Internet, you must have spent the past decade under
a rock-or be a member of the United States Supreme Court. Supreme
Court Justices lately have displayed a startling level of ignorance
about computing and communication methods that many Americans
take for granted. Justice Clarence Thomas "generally characterizes the
1
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